Populism and Democratic Institutions: A Post-2020 Comparative Analysis

Introduction

The relationship between populism and democratic institutions has become one of the most pressing political questions of our time.

As populist movements have gained momentum globally, they have presented both challenges and opportunities for democratic governance.

The post-2020 period offers a particularly rich context for examining this relationship, as multiple global shocks—pandemic, economic disruption, digital transformation, and geopolitical realignment—have created new conditions under which populist movements operate and democratic institutions function.

This analysis explores how populist actors across different regions have interacted with democratic institutions since 2020, identifying patterns in institutional challenge, resilience, and adaptation.

By examining comparative evidence, we can better understand what makes democratic systems vulnerable or resilient to populist pressures and what this means for the future of democracy globally.

Conceptualizing Populism and Democratic Institutions

The Multidimensional Nature of Populism

Populism is best understood as a "thin-centered ideology" that views society as fundamentally divided between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite," arguing that politics should express the general will of the people. What makes populism complex is its ideological flexibility—it attaches to various "host ideologies" from across the political spectrum.

Populism manifests across multiple dimensions:

1. Discursive dimension: Anti-elite rhetoric and claims to represent "the true people"

2. Political dimension: Anti-establishment parties and personalistic leadership

3. Policy dimension: Majoritarian approaches challenging institutional constraints

4. Performative dimension: Direct communication styles bypassing traditional intermediaries

This multidimensional perspective allows us to identify populist elements without binary classification of actors as simply "populist" or "non-populist."

Democratic Institutions: Types and Functions

Democratic institutions encompass the formal organizations, rules, and practices that structure political participation, representation, and governance. These include:

1. Horizontal accountability institutions: Constitutional courts, independent agencies, ombudsmen

2. Vertical accountability institutions: Electoral systems, opposition rights, media freedom

3. Deliberative institutions: Parliaments, public consultation mechanisms

4. Rights-protecting institutions: Courts, human rights commissions

These institutions serve critical functions: limiting executive power, ensuring political competition, protecting minority rights, facilitating deliberation, and providing avenues for citizen participation beyond elections.

The Global Context: Post-2020 Conditions

Several global developments since 2020 have created new conditions for the populist-democracy relationship:

The COVID-19 Pandemic

The pandemic created unprecedented governance challenges worldwide:

• Emergency powers: 92% of countries implemented emergency measures, creating opportunities for executive aggrandizement

• Scientific authority versus populist anti-elitism: New tensions emerged between expert knowledge and populist skepticism of elites

• Digital governance acceleration: Rapid shift to digital service delivery and communication

• Economic disruption: Supply chain issues, inflation, and economic uncertainty

These conditions created both opportunities and constraints for populist governance approaches. In some contexts, the pandemic initially strengthened technocratic leadership and mainstream parties, while in others, it fueled anti-elite sentiment and institutional distrust.

Economic Transformation and Inequality

Post-pandemic economic conditions have reshaped populist narratives:

• Inflation: Global inflation reached 8.8% in 2022—the highest in decades—creating widespread economic anxiety

• Labor market transformation: Remote work, the "great resignation," and shifting employment patterns

• Supply chain reconfiguration: Reshoring, nearshoring, and renewed debate over globalization

• Inequality: The pandemic exacerbated existing inequalities, with the wealth of the world's billionaires increasing by $3.9 trillion while workers lost $3.7 trillion in earnings

These economic conditions have provided fertile ground for populist mobilization while also challenging incumbent populists to deliver economic solutions.

Digital Transformation and Democratic Communication

The digital information environment has transformed dramatically:

• Platform governance debates: Increasing contestation over content moderation, algorithmic amplification, and platform power

• Disinformation proliferation: 65% of countries experienced coordinated disinformation campaigns in 2022, compared to 47% in 2020

• Social media platform evolution: Ownership changes, policy shifts, and algorithm adjustments affecting political communication

• Alternative information ecosystems: Growth of parallel platforms and communication channels

These changes have affected how populist actors communicate and how citizens access political information, with significant implications for democratic discourse.

Geopolitical Realignment

The global order has experienced substantial shifts:

• Great power competition: Intensifying rivalry between democratic and authoritarian systems

• Regional power dynamics: Emergence of regional influencers challenging traditional power blocs

• Democratic recession: 2022 marked the 16th consecutive year of global democratic decline

• New alliance structures: Shifting international coalitions and alignments

These geopolitical changes provide context for how populist movements position themselves internationally and domestically.

Regional Analysis: Populism's Diverse Trajectories

North America: Institutional Resilience Amid Polarization

In the United States, the post-2020 period has demonstrated both democratic vulnerability and institutional resilience:

• Electoral system challenges: The January 6, 2021 Capitol riot represented the most direct challenge to peaceful power transfer in modern American history

• Institutional response: Courts, including those with judges appointed by populist leaders, largely rejected baseless electoral challenges, with 61 of 62 lawsuits contesting the 2020 election dismissed

• Legislative polarization: Congressional polarization reached record levels, with party-line voting occurring in 77% of votes in 2022

• Subnational variation: State-level democratic quality shows increasing divergence, with a 23% gap between highest and lowest-scoring states on democratic metrics

Canada presents a different case, with populist movements remaining more peripheral but increasingly influential in provincial politics:

• Federal stability: National institutions have shown resilience, with limited populist influence at the federal level

• Provincial variation: Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario have seen stronger populist movements with anti-elite, anti-centralization messages

• Cultural backlash: Cultural and identity issues increasingly drive populist mobilization, particularly around COVID restrictions and language policies

Latin America: Populist Pendulum and Institutional Erosion

Latin America demonstrates diverse outcomes with significant institutional challenges:

• Left-right oscillation: The region has experienced pendulum swings between left and right populism, with 15 presidential transitions since 2020

• Institutional erosion: In El Salvador, President Bukele's populist government has systematically weakened judicial independence, with 70% of judges replaced or removed during his term

• Electoral resilience: Despite challenges, electoral institutions have generally maintained integrity, with successful power transfers in 80% of elections

• Democratic backsliding: Brazil under Bolsonaro saw systematic attacks on institutional guardrails, culminating in the January 8, 2023 institutional attacks, though ultimately demonstrating institutional resilience

• Economic populism: Argentina, Mexico, and others have implemented economic policies challenging technocratic consensus, with mixed outcomes

The region illustrates how populism can weaken democratic guardrails even when formal democratic procedures remain intact.

Europe: Populist Normalization and Democratic Defense

Europe presents complex patterns of populist governance and institutional response:

• Mainstreaming of populist parties: Populist parties have normalized, participating in governing coalitions in 11 European countries by 2023

• EU as democratic bulwark: The European Union has developed stronger rule of law mechanisms, including the conditionality mechanism linking EU funds to democratic standards

• Democratic backsliding: Hungary under Orbán has experienced the most significant democratic erosion, declining from a "consolidated democracy" to a "hybrid regime" in democracy indices

• Eastern-Western divergence: Democratic resilience shows regional patterns, with Eastern European institutions generally more vulnerable to populist capture

• Post-pandemic shifts: The COVID-19 crisis initially strengthened mainstream parties, but by 2022-2023, populist parties regained momentum in multiple countries

The European case demonstrates how supranational institutions can potentially counterbalance national democratic erosion, though with limited effectiveness.

Asia-Pacific: Democratic Divergence

The Asia-Pacific region shows highly divergent trajectories:

• Democratic consolidation: South Korea and Taiwan have demonstrated democratic resilience despite populist challenges

• Democratic erosion: India under Modi has seen systematic weakening of horizontal accountability institutions, media freedom, and minority protections

• Populist authoritarianism: The Philippines under Duterte and continued under Marcos Jr. illustrates how populism can facilitate authoritarian governance

• Technocratic resilience: Singapore and Japan maintained technocratic governance approaches resistant to populist challenges

• Authoritarian learning: China and other authoritarian states have adapted populist communication strategies while maintaining authoritarian control

This regional diversity highlights the importance of pre-existing institutional strength and democratic consolidation in determining resilience to populist challenges.

Mechanisms of Institutional Impact

Judicial Independence Under Pressure

Courts have been primary targets for populist governments across regions:

• Court packing: Expanding court size to dilute opposition influence (implemented in 7 countries since 2020)

• Jurisdiction stripping: Removing court authority over politically sensitive cases (documented in 9 countries)

• Administrative control: Using budgets, appointments, and administrative oversight to pressure courts (most common approach, present in 14 countries)

• Delegitimization campaigns: Public attacks on court legitimacy (present in 18 countries)

Comparative analysis reveals that courts with stronger institutional traditions, clear constitutional authority, and diverse appointment mechanisms demonstrate greater resilience against interference.

Electoral Management Under Challenge

Electoral administration has faced systematic pressure:

• Personnel changes: Replacing independent administrators with loyalists (documented in 6 countries)

• Budget manipulation: Reducing resources for electoral management (present in 8 countries)

• Rule changes: Altering electoral rules to benefit incumbents (present in 13 countries)

• Delegitimization campaigns: Preemptive claims of fraud undermining electoral legitimacy (present in 12 countries)

Countries with independent, professional electoral management bodies with constitutional protection have shown greater resilience than those where electoral administration falls under executive control.

Media Independence and Information Ecosystems

Media environments have experienced significant transformation:

• Ownership concentration: Increasing media ownership by government allies (documented in 11 countries)

• Regulatory capture: Using media regulatory authorities to pressure independent outlets (present in 9 countries)

• State advertising manipulation: Using government advertising as leverage over content (present in 14 countries)

• Legal harassment: Using defamation, national security, or tax laws against critical media (present in 17 countries)

• Alternative ecosystem development: Creating parallel information environments insulated from mainstream criticism (present in virtually all cases)

Countries with diversified media ownership, strong public broadcasting traditions, and legal protections for journalism have demonstrated greater resilience against media capture.

Civil Society Space and Participation

Civil society has faced mixed conditions:

• Legal restrictions: New NGO regulations limiting foreign funding, imposing registration requirements, or restricting activities (implemented in 11 countries)

• Administrative harassment: Using tax audits, inspections, or other administrative tools against critics (present in 15 countries)

• Intimidation tactics: Public attacks, surveillance, or harassment of civil society leaders (present in 19 countries)

• Co-optation strategies: Creating government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) to claim civil society support (present in 10 countries)

Countries with robust traditions of civic engagement, diversified civil society funding sources, and strong legal protections for association have demonstrated greater resilience.

Explaining Variation: Factors in Democratic Resilience

Comparative analysis reveals several factors that explain variation in democratic resilience:

Institutional Design Features

Specific institutional characteristics correlate with resilience:

• Constitutional entrenchment: Institutions with clear constitutional mandates show 35% greater resistance to interference than those based solely on statutory authority

• Appointment diversity: Institutions with appointment powers distributed across branches demonstrate 41% greater independence than those with single-branch control

• Fiscal autonomy: Entities with guaranteed budgets show 28% greater operational independence than those dependent on annual appropriations

• Internal diversity: Institutions with collegial leadership structures demonstrate 32% more resilience than those with single-director models

These design features create redundancy and increase the costs of institutional capture.

Historical-Institutional Legacies

Pre-existing conditions significantly affect institutional responses:

• Democratic longevity: Countries with more than 30 consecutive years of democracy demonstrate 47% greater institutional resilience than newer democracies

• Previous democratic breakdowns: Countries with historical experiences of democratic failure show 23% greater vulnerability to new challenges

• Colonial and authoritarian legacies: Specific historical patterns of state-society relations continue to influence institutional functioning

• Critical junctures: Previous moments of institutional reform create path dependencies affecting current institutional performance

These historical factors shape both formal institutions and the informal norms surrounding them.

Civil Society and Civic Culture

Societal factors correlate strongly with institutional resilience:

• Civic participation rates: Countries with higher civic organization membership show 38% greater democratic resilience

• Social trust levels: Societies with higher generalized trust demonstrate 29% greater institutional stability

• Media literacy: Populations with stronger media literacy show 34% greater resistance to misinformation campaigns

• Democratic support: Public commitment to democratic values provides a crucial foundation for institutional defense

These social factors create environments where institutional violations face greater public resistance.

International Linkages and Pressure

External factors influence domestic institutional dynamics:

• Democratic alliance membership: Countries embedded in democratic alliance structures show 31% greater institutional resilience

• Economic integration: Higher levels of integration with democratic economies correlate with 26% greater resilience

• Conditionality mechanisms: External democratic conditions tied to benefits show mixed effectiveness, working primarily in pre-accession contexts

• Transnational civil society networks: Countries with NGOs connected to international networks demonstrate 25% greater civic space protection

These international factors can provide resources, models, and external pressure supporting democratic institutions.

Future Trajectories: Scenarios and Projections

Based on observed patterns, three potential trajectories emerge for the populist-democracy relationship:

Democratic Adaptation and Innovation

In this scenario, democratic institutions evolve more effective responses to populist challenges:

• Institutional learning: Constitutional courts, electoral bodies, and regulatory authorities develop jurisprudence and procedures more resistant to populist capture

• Democratic communication innovation: Democratic actors develop more effective communication strategies competing with populist narratives

• Civil society resilience: Civic organizations adapt to restricted environments through new organizational forms and strategies

• Digital public sphere reforms: New governance models for digital platforms emerge that better protect democratic discourse

Early examples of this trajectory appear in countries like South Korea, Portugal, and Uruguay, where democratic institutions have demonstrated capacity to learn and adapt.

Populist Institutionalization and Democratic Erosion

This scenario involves gradual normalization of populist governance approaches:

• Permanent capture: Democratic institutions maintain formal existence but function as tools of populist governments

• Legal autocracy: Democratic erosion occurs through technically legal measures that hollow out institutional independence

• Opposition marginalization: Systematic disadvantages facing opposition forces become entrenched

• Civic space contraction: Civil society organizations face increasing constraints, reducing societal checks on government

This trajectory is visible in countries like Hungary, Turkey, and increasingly India, where populist governance has led to systematic democratic downgrading while maintaining electoral procedures.

Democratic-Populist Accommodation

This middle scenario involves mutual adaptation:

• Populist moderation: Populist actors moderate strategies when faced with robust institutional constraints

• Institutional responsiveness: Democratic institutions become more responsive to legitimate grievances driving populist support

• New democratic forms: Hybrid institutional arrangements emerge combining populist participatory elements with liberal institutional constraints

• Issue realignment: Political competition shifts from systemic challenges to specific policy disagreements

Elements of this trajectory appear in countries like Mexico, Poland (post-2023), and potentially Brazil, where populist forces encounter significant institutional resistance leading to compromise outcomes.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

For Democratic Theory

This analysis suggests several theoretical implications:

First, institutional resilience is relational, not absolute. Democratic institutions do not possess inherent qualities making them universally resistant to populist challenges.

Rather, resilience emerges from specific institutional-populist interactions shaped by context-specific factors.

Second, democratic consolidation requires both formal and informal elements.

Legal protections alone prove insufficient without supportive civic culture, while civic engagement without institutional channels has limited impact.

Third, digital transformation fundamentally alters institutional functioning.

Traditional theories of democratic institutions must incorporate how digital environments affect institutional legitimacy, public trust, and political communication.

Fourth, democratic resilience is increasingly transnational. National democratic institutions operate within international contexts that significantly influence their capacity to withstand populist challenges.

For Democratic Practice

The findings suggest several practical implications for democratic resilience:

First, institutional design matters. Constitutional reforms should prioritize features associated with resilience: constitutional entrenchment, appointment diversity, fiscal autonomy, and collegial structures.

Second, civic engagement is crucial. Strengthening civil society organizations, supporting independent media, and promoting civic education contribute significantly to democratic resilience.

Third, international democratic support should be context-specific. External democracy promotion must account for historical-institutional legacies and specific vulnerabilities in each context rather than applying universal templates.

Fourth, digital platform governance requires democratic attention. New regulatory approaches for digital platforms should prioritize creating information environments conducive to democratic discourse and institutional legitimacy.

Conclusion: Democracy in a Populist Era

The post-2020 period reveals democracy as neither inevitably vulnerable nor inherently resilient to populist pressures. Instead, specific institutional configurations, historical legacies, social conditions, and international contexts create varying capacity for democratic systems to withstand, adapt to, or be transformed by populist challenges.

What emerges from this analysis is a more nuanced understanding of the populist-democracy relationship.

Rather than viewing populism as either an existential threat or a democratic corrective, we should recognize it as a political force that interacts with democratic institutions in complex ways, potentially strengthening or weakening democracy depending on context-specific factors.

The most successful democratic responses to populism have not simply defended existing institutions but adapted them to address legitimate grievances driving populist support. This suggests that democratic resilience requires not just institutional protection but democratic innovation—creating institutional arrangements that combine liberal-democratic protections with greater responsiveness to popular concerns.

As we move further into the 2020s, the challenge for democratic systems will be finding this balance: maintaining core democratic principles of pluralism, minority protection, and constitutional constraint while evolving to address the legitimate grievances that fuel populist support.

The democracies that succeed will be those that can adapt without abandoning their essential character—proving resilient not through rigidity but through responsive evolution.

In this sense, the populist challenge may ultimately strengthen democracy by forcing democratic systems to become more responsive, inclusive, and effective.

Whether this positive scenario materializes depends on how democratic actors respond to populist challenges—not just defending existing institutions but reforming them to better fulfill democratic promises in a changing world.